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and Profane, pages 182, 194, and 204, and Concordant Discord [Oxford, 
1970], pages 203-205.) If so, they can't be identical. (d) Zaehner cites texts 
to show that theistic mystics sometimes distinguish between monistic and 
theistic states on the basis of their own first hand experience. (Cf. e.g., 
Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, page 189, and Zaehner's discussion of 
Ramanuja and al-Junayd in Hindu and Muslim Mysticism [London, 1960].) 
This too implies that the experiences differ. (e) Zaehner not only thinks that 
theistic mystics differ doctrinally and behaviorally from monistic mystics; he 
also believes that the mystical states of the former are an enjoyment of God 
while those of the latter are (only) an enjoyment of (the unity of) their own 
souls. I find it hard to believe that Zaehner would have thought that one and 
the same phenomenological state could either be an enjoyment of God or an 
enjoyment of one's own soul depending on the behavioral and doctrinal 
context in which it occurs. 
But these are quibbles. Pike's book is a major contribution to the literature 
on mysticism and to the philosophy of religion in general. It is the best book 
of its kind to have appeared since the important work of Farges, Poulain, and 
Butler in the early part of the century. It is superior to theirs in its analytic 
acumen and philosophical sophistication. I recommend it without reservation. 
Passionate Reason: Making Sense Of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Frag-
ments, by C. Stephen Evans. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1992. Pp. xii and 205. $29.95 (Cloth). 
ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Wheaton College 
Steve Evans's latest book is the third book-length commentary on 
Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments to be published in the last ten years. I 
In a time when books on Kierkegaard are hard to publish and elicit little honor 
from the community of professional philosophers, this much careful attention 
to one booklet (just over 100 pages) in Kierkegaard's large corpus of works 
seems to need explaining. I think the explanation is that Fragments addresses 
an issue of momentous relevance to Christian thought, an issue on which the 
preservation of Christianity itself turns, but couches its pronouncements on 
that issue in an enigmatic format and sometimes in oracular statements that 
seem to undermine its own project of preserving the conceptual integrity of 
Christianity. Thus the booklet seems important, but also seems to call for 
quite a lot of clarifying. 
Unlike Evans's Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The Christian Phi-
losophy of Johannes Climacus (Humanities Press, 1983), which treated 
Kierkegaard's whole "Climacus literature" topically, Passionate Reason is a 
more or less chapter-by-chapter discussion just of Fragments. Evans distin-
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guishes his approach from two others, that he calls the "philosophical" and 
the "ironical." "Philosophical" interpreters like Elrod and Pojman read 
Kierkegaard as though he were an everyday flatfooted propounder of philo-
sophical ideas like Kant, Aristotle and the early Heidegger; they seem to miss 
the literary force essential to Kierkegaard's writings. By contrast, "ironical" 
interpreters like Louis Mackey and Mark C. Taylor and the disciples of 
Jacques Derrida write as though Kierkegaard stands for nothing, communi-
cates no substance, and undermines at every turn anything he might be seem-
ing to say; such commentators too miss something, namely that Kierkegaard's 
writings are dedicated to communicating Christianity (a definite way of life 
embodied in particular teachings) to an audience who have a confused and 
disabling understanding of it. Evans seeks a middle ground that avoids both 
literary clubfootedness and French craziness, one that is sensitive to irony 
and Kierkegaard's other literary devices, while keeping sight of the fact that 
our author has some quite definite ideas to get across. 
Some of the central issues of substance that Fragments addresses, all cen-
tering around the concept of faith, are the following: How accessible is human 
fulfilment, the good for human beings? Is it generally accessible, as Greek 
and German philosophy have tended to suppose, or does it depend on a 
special, culturally and historically particular intervention of God, as orthodox 
Christianity has claimed? Is it rational to believe in the incarnation of God? 
Is historical research relevant to belief in the incarnation? What are the 
relative roles of the believer's assessment of evidence and the believer's will 
and subjectivity in his coming to faith and remaining in it? With the inter-
pretive problems raised by Fragments as point of departure, Evans gives us 
judicious, substantive discussions of these and related topics. Thus the book 
is not just a commentary, much less a merely historical or philological study, 
but a significant offering in Christian philosophy. 
Fragments poses as a thought experiment in which the way Socrates relates 
to his disciples is contrasted with a "hypothetical" case of a teacher-learner 
relationship that differs from the Socratic in every possible fundamental way. 
In the course of counterposing these two conceptions of the realization of 
one's human nature, Johannes Climacus (the pseudonymous author of Frag-
ments) forcefully makes a number of conceptual points about faith: 1) faith 
is a real dependency, in the sense that any departure from fellowship with 
one's "teacher" is a departure from "the truth" (whereas Socrates is only a 
dispensable occasion for his "disciple's" becoming self-realized); 2) faith is 
the realization of a telos from which one is deeply estranged (on the Socratic 
view, one bears in oneself the potential for self-realization); 3) faith marks a 
process of being recreated by the teacher (the Socratic disciple comes into 
possession of the truth through self-exploration, "recollection"); 4) faith is 
thus in significant ways discontinuous with what is taken to be normal or 
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rational for human beings, and thus requires overcoming the possibility of 
"offense;" 5) the "teacher" of faith is God, whereas Socrates is only a human 
being; 6) the God to whom one clings for self-realization is also a human 
being, that is, incarnate, a historical figure; 7) historical inquiry about this 
"teacher" has a questionable status vis-a-vis our self-realization since a) the 
teacher is God and is thus equally accessible to every generation, and yet b) 
is a historical figure in the ordinary sense of "historical"-sense-perceptually 
observable by his contemporaries, subject to less or more accurate reports 
passed on in more or less reliable ways, etc.-and c) is the paradox (to 
unconverted or inadequately converted minds, conceptual oddity) of God's 
living in time and space incarnate as this single historical individual. 
The distinction between the Socratic and the Christian understandings of 
the teacher-disciple relationship is momentous because A) our understanding 
of our relationship to Christ affects the shape that faith takes in our lives-the 
issue being whether we will develop as "Socratic" individuals or as Chris-
tians;2 and B) on the Fragments reading of the distinction, a number of 
prominent Christian theologians, including not just Hegel but also Schleier-
macher, Bultmann, Tillich, and Cobb (but not Barth, Brunner, or Hauerwas) 
seem to turn Jesus into a Socratic teacher, and thus to undermine Christian 
faith in the congregations that are influenced by their thought. Protecting the 
reader's faith from conceptual sag and shift is the therapeutic purpose of 
Fragments. 
As Evans's subtitle suggests, the book is not easily made sense of, and 
Evans offers one plausible reading of its literary form. Chapter 1 of Frag-
ments begins the thought experiment in which Climacus starts from the idea 
of a Socratic teacher and his relationship to his disciples, and deduces, by 
negation of each of the features of that relationship, the idea of another kind 
of teacher. The deduced idea-that the teacher is a unique divine savior and 
that the disciple is in bondage to sin and needs to be reborn through a 
miraculous intervention of this savior-looks remarkably like Christianity. 
Has Christianity thus been invented, using just elementary logic and some 
acquaintance with Socratic teachers? No, says, Evans; the hypothetical char-
acter of the chapter is Kierkegaard's irony; but this does not prevent the 
chapter from having a serious Christian-philosophical purpose: the logical 
distinctions between the Socratic and the Christian models of teacher-disciple 
relationship that are made indirectly under the guise of the "deduction" are 
all precisely correct and of great importance to those who would nurture 
Christian faith. 
On Evans's reading, chapter 2 (subtitled "A Poetical Venture") functions 
quite differently from chapter one. "The pretense of a logical deduction is 
here dropped" and now imagination, rather than logical reflection, is used to 
sketch the way the divine teacher "might carry out the task of teaching the 
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learner by transforming him" (46). The chapter's conclusion is that the divine 
teacher must humble himself and become incarnate as a human being who is 
equal to the lowliest of humanity, and that the relationship he thus forms with 
the disciple is one of love. A chief vehicle of Climacus's ruminations is a 
story of an exalted king who falls in love with a humble maiden and delib-
erates about how to woo her without violating her autonomy. Despite the 
obvious "poetic" character of this chapter, it seems clear to me that it continues 
the "deductive" program of the first chapter. The conclusion of chapter 2 is more 
Christian doctrine (the incarnation and God's love), to be added to that garnered 
in chapter 1, and though the imagination functions in the concoction of the fairy 
tale, the latter is really a vehicle for some heavy argumentation, helped along by 
some ad hoc assumptions, such as that the divine teacher is an unmoved mover 
and that love requires equality between its parties. This is clear enough from 
Evans's treatment, for he discusses all the arguments. 
Philosophical Fragments is a leading inspiration for Kierkegaard's reputa-
tion as an enemy of reason. This reputation comes from such concepts as the 
absurd, the leap of faith, and Jesus Christ as the absolute paradox. This last 
concept is the centerpiece of chapter 3. For nearly twenty years Evans has 
been defending Kierkegaard against the charge (or praise) that he is an irra-
tionalist-that he holds faith to involve believing some contradictory set of 
statements like "God cannot be temporal" and "Jesus is identical with God" 
and "Jesus is temporal." Evans's arguments against this interpretation are 
conveniently brought together and forcefully stated in Passionate Reason. On 
his reading Kierkegaard holds that the concept of reason-that is, the set of 
standards for rationality-is itself contestable, and that the Christian faith 
transforms any concept of rationality that we may start with. (It does not 
change the rules of formal logic.) This is largely because Christianity attrib-
utes sin to us, which is a condition of not being able to realize our telos 
without a special intervention from God. So faith is contrary to reason insofar 
as reason is conceived as implying our "imperialistic" ability to know our-
selves and our situation apart from the miracles of the incarnation and our 
own spiritual rebirth. But Christians carryon their lives by a set of epistemic 
and practical standards that presuppose the incarnation for the knowledge of 
self and situation and telos; so on another reading of reason, faith is not 
contrary to reason; indeed, this version of reason is of faith's very essence. 
We might say that much of Fragments is a delineation of the contrast between 
Socratic reason-a sort of generic pagan outlook on matters of knowledge 
relating to self-realization-and Christian reason. Evans shows convincingly 
that when Kierkegaard calls the incarnation a "contradiction," he is not saying 
that it violates the laws of logic, but instead that it violates the deeply en-
grained expectations of people whose minds and hearts are oriented by So-
cratic reason. 
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On such substantive issues of Christian philosophy as the one I have just 
mentioned, I find it very hard to fault Evans's book, but on the issue of its 
form I think Passionate Reason can be improved on. Chapter 3 of Fragments 
can seem like a hodge-podge, with some dark sayings about the depth-psy-
chology of "reason" and the god being "the unknown," claims about the 
absolute paradoxicality of the divine teacher, a critique of some arguments 
for God's existence, and an appendix on the psychology of "offense." Evans 
points out that the following chapter (4) begins where "chapter 2 leaves off 
and continues the tale of the god who becomes a human being." Thus chapter 
3 "seems to be a kind of digression," and Evans thinks "it is best to see the 
chapter as a kind of starting-over, a retracing of some of the same ground 
covered in chapters 1 and 2, though from a slightly different angle" (58). I 
think this is correct, but seeing in what sense it is a retracing of the same 
ground and what the different angle is, enables us to see this "digression" as 
a continuation of the mock-deduction of Christian doctrine begun in chapter 
1. It is a retracing of the same ground in the sense that this chapter too is 
about the relationship of the incarnate divine teacher to the disciple, but now 
the angle taken on this subject is psychological (in a broad sense): whereas 
chapter 2 was about the incarnation from the point of view of the divine 
teacher, chapter 3 is about the incarnation from the point of view of the human 
disciple or potential disciple. The Christian doctrine that is deduced-again, 
via a number of ad hoc assumptions and elusive arguments-and then ex-
plored, is the doctrine of offense found in Matt. 11.6, 13.21, 13.57, 24.10, 
26.31-33, and I Cor. 1.18-25. 
A very judicious aspect of Evans' book is his criticism of what he takes to 
be Fragments' position on the relation of faith and history. I summarize 
Evans's position in the following remarks: 
1. While Christian faith is more than just assenting to christological propo-
sitions, it does involve believing that the historical person Jesus of 
Nazareth was the incarnation of God. It cannot be reduced to an expe-
rience or insight or set of character traits in response to Jesus taken as 
a symbol expressive of some deep aspect of ourselves. (With that we 
would have returned to the "Socratic.") 
2. The belief that Jesus is God incarnate is always in some sense a response 
to something historical-in the case of the original disciples, Jesus him-
self, in the case of later generations of disciples, a report about Jesus. 
3. No amount of information about Jesus (historical evidence that he is the 
incarnation of God) is sufficient for faith. 
4. Neither is historical evidence necessary for Christian faith, since faith 
may be properly grounded in a direct encounter with the risen Lord. 
Such an encounter may ground one's confidence in the historical record, 
rather than vice-versa. 
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5. However. historical evidence is not irrelevant to Christian faith. If the 
church had not regarded much of the New Testament as supporting belief 
in the incarnation, it would not have offered the witness that has in fact 
occasioned faith in many people over the millenia, and if serious chal-
lenges to the reliability of the New Testament as evidence for the incar-
nation are presented, they are to be countered with historical arguments. 
6. However, "evidence" has a double "for." It is evidence for a proposition, 
but it is also evidence for somebody. What counts as evidence for the 
incarnation for somebody who has encountered the risen Lord may differ 
markedly from what counts as evidence for somebody who has not. 
While I think we have reason for taking somewhat less seriously than Evans 
does the passages in Fragments that seem to deny #5, I agree with Evans in 
holding ##1-6 to be true. Evans has done a genuine service in clarifying and 
enriching these and many other aspects of Philosophical Fragments. I think 
it is safe to say that Evans's reading of Fragments is more sober and less 
controversial than the readings of Nielsen and Roberts. 
NOTES 
1. The other two are Harry Nielsen's Where the Passion Is: A Reading of Kierkegaard's 
Philosophical Fragments (University Presses of Florida, 1983) and Robert Roberts's 
Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments (Mercer 
University Press, 1986). 
2. Kierkegaard never disdains a truly Socratic personality development; indeed he holds 
it up as a model to be admired and imitated. But he insists throughout his authorship that 
it is not the same as Christian faith. 
The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, 
ed. by Edmund N. Santurri and William Werpehowski. Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp.307, $25.00 (paper). 
FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER, Purdue University and Western Washing-
ton University 
Contrary to what the title suggests, this collection focusses on the command-
ment to love one's neighbor as oneself, although many of the authors acknow-
ledge that this commandment is subordinate to the first and great 
commandment, to love God with one's whole heart, and mind and soul. It 
contains a brief introduction and nine papers all apparently written by theo-
logians or experts in religious studies. I shall discuss each of these papers in 
turn. 
Gene Dutka's "Universal Love and Impartiality" addresses this question: 
given that we ought to love our neighbors as ourselves, ought we to be 
impartial between others and ourselves? It is important to be clear about what 
